El yo fracturado. Sensación de agencia y psicopatología

Luis Moisés López Flores

Resumen


Tras los experimentos de B. Libet, la discusión contemporánea sobre la libertad y el determinismo ha inclinado la balanza hacia este úl-timo. El avance de las neurocienciasha reenfocado la discusión antes centrada en la idea de libertad hacia el concepto de “sensación de agen-cia” (SA) y con ello el trabajo de la psicopatología de la acción ha sido un terreno fructífero para dicha querella. En la presente investigación sos-tengo que algunos casos de disrupciones en la agencia, como algunas patologías psicológicas y motoras, pueden servir como evidencia para SA. Al final de la investigación revisaré algunas consecuencias normativas del SA.


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Palabras clave


psicopatología filosófica; sentido de agencia; libertad y determinismo; filosofía de la psiquiatría;

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/NATyLIB.2019.v1i11.5578

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