Does the Heart Have Reasons? Damasio's Somatic Markers in the Light of the Debate on Practical Rationality

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.29.3.2024.19704

Keywords:

Damasio, somatic markers, internal and external rationality, explanatory reasons

Abstract

The article puts forward a critical examination of Damasio's somatic-markers hypothesis in Descartes' Error by means of conceptual distinctions from the debate on practical rationality. After the introduction (I) and the reconstructing of the Damasian hypothesis (II) the paper highlights some of its conceptual problems (III). It subsequently approaches the hypothesis from the distinction between internal and external rationality (IV) and from a distinction between types of explanatory reasons (V). It finally discusses the Pascalian idea that the heart has reasons in a critical light by means of several arguments developed in the preceding sections (VI).

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References

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Published

2024-12-20

How to Cite

Crelier, A. (2024). Does the Heart Have Reasons? Damasio’s Somatic Markers in the Light of the Debate on Practical Rationality. Contrastes. Revista Internacional De Filosofía, 29(3), 17–35. https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.29.3.2024.19704