Thomson on Goodness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Metyper.2018.v0i19.4897Keywords:
Metaethics, Judith Thomson, Consequentialism, Moral goodAbstract
Judith Jarvis Thomson has written extensively on what is usually (though she does not seem much to care for the word) known as ‘metaethics’. Notably in the Thomson half of Harman and Thomson’s 1996 Moral Knowledge and Moral Objectivity, the 1997 Journal of Philosophy paper “The Right and the Good”, and her Tanner Lectures in Goodness and Advice published in 2003. Thomson thinks there is no such thing as being good simpliciter. There is only what she sometimes talks of as being good in a way or being good in some respect. A thing can be good at stuff, good at football or baking or whatever. This critical note analyses what is at stake in Thomson's approach.
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Philippa Foot: “Utilitarianism and the Virtues” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 57, 1983, pp. 273-283.
Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson: Morality and Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)
Judith Jarvis Thomson: "The Right and the Good" in Journal of Philosophy, June 1997, pp. 273-298.
Judith Jarvis Thomson: Goodness and Advice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003)
Judith Jarvis Thomson: Normativity (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 2008)
Barnard Williams: Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
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