On the dynamic stability of the Cournot duopoly solution under bounded rationality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/recta.22.1.2021.19873Palabras clave:
Nonlinear duopoly, expectations, Cournot-Nash equilibrium, dynamic stabilityResumen
La mayoría de los modelos de oligopolio descritos en la literatura analizan los procesos dinámicos y la estabilidad del equilibrio de Nash mediante la introducción de especificaciones concretas para las funciones de demanda y de costes. Este trabajo analiza la estabilidad dinámica del equilibrio de Cournot-Nash en el contexto de un duopolio utilizando funciones generales para describir tanto la demanda como los costes. Se concluye que la condición que garantiza la estabilidad del equilibrio de Nash bajo el proceso de ajuste implícito en el modelo original de Cournot es un requisito clave en la estabilidad dinámica del equilibrio de Cournot-Nash independientemente del esquema de expectativas de las empresas. Además, esta condición es más decisiva cuanto mayor sea el grado de racionalidad de las empresas.
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