Consideraciones en torno a la reducción solipsista
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v11i0.1464Abstract
Resumen
En el presente trabajo se intentará mostrar que la fenomenología no conduce a una postura solipsista. Para ello, se caracterizará en qué consiste el solipsismo. Luego, se intentará refutar a lo que se ha de llamar “solipsismo metafísico” y “solipsismo gnoseológico”, con el objetivo principal de poner de manifiesto el fundamento de motivación para la salida de la ficción solipsista.
Palabras claves:
Phenomenology – solipsim – empatía - Husserl
Abstract
With the aim of showing that phenomenology does not lead in solipsism, I will first attempt a characterization of it. Then, I will attempt a refutation of the so-called “metaphysical” and “epistemological” solipsisms. Finally, the nature and role of Husserl´s solipsistic fiction is examined, and the grounds that motivate the overcoming of this standpoint are disclosed.
key words
Fenomenología – solipsismo - empathy – Husserl
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