A Possible Pragmatic Aim of Belief
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v22i2.3530Keywords:
Belief, Truth, Pragmatism, Acceptance, Wishful ThinkingAbstract
The links between belief, truth and pragmatism are recurrent topics in epistemology. Recently, some publications have analyzed the aims of belief, following Williams’ popular statement ‘belief aims at truth’. Some of these authors defend a normative link between belief and truth and they explore the possible epistemic norms of belief, while others prefer to analyze beliefs in terms of values. Other philosophers defend that beliefs do not always aim at truth. Here I analyze and compare these ideas about belief, truth and pragmatism defending that belief can be better understood with a constitutive relationship between belief and truth.
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Marco Antonio Joven Romero es profesor en el Departamento de Lenguas Extranjeras de la Universidad de Santo Tomás de Manila y lector en la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo (AECID) en Filipinas. Previamente desarrolló su tesis doctoral en el Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia de la UNED bajo la dirección del profesor Jesús Zamora Bonilla, gracias a una beca de Formación de Personal Investigador del Gobierno de Aragón y a los proyectos FFI:2013-23267 y FFI:2014-57258-P del Ministerio de Industria, Economía y Competitividad.
Líneas de investigación:
Epismetología, filosofía de las ciencias sociales, normatividad, filosofía del lenguaje,
lingu?ística comparada, filología aragonesa.
Publicaciones recientes:
- (forthcoming). On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance. Contemporary Pragmatism. University at Buffalo.
- (2017). Unas cuantas cosas sobre la normativización del aragonés. Revista de Filología Románica, 32 (2). Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 325-344.
- (2017). Revolución crítica: aproximación a los cambios sociales actuales como consecuencia del desarrollo y la evolución de las nuevas tecnologías. Anales de la Fundación Joaquín Costa, 29. Instituto de Estudios Altoaragoneses-Diputación Provincial de Huesca.
- (2016). On Norms. An Application of Brennan’s and Bicchieri’s Ideas to Bad Citizenship and Civil Disobedience. Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Does Democracty Translate Across Borders?
- (2015). Norms: Between a Social and an Agential Nature. Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, 2 (1). Universidad de Zaragoza.
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