Human Sciences: A Horizon of Totality for Scientific Reductionism. Complaints and Pro-posals matching in Ortega y Gasset and Paul Karl Feyerabend
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https://doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v25i2.6857Keywords:
ORTEGA Y GASSET, REDUCTIONISM, HUMAN SCIENCES, PERSPECTIVISM, FEYERABENDAbstract
The experimental designs adopted in the empirical sciences translate and select phenomenal externalizations, so that they constitute certain forms of perception and verification possibilities that come from the «object » itself. On a meta-theoretical level, we could identify in such designs reductionisms that facilitate all kinds of epistemic and methodological simplifications at the expense of eliminating things that need to be understood and that are part of a complete picture of the phenomenon we study. By reductionism, we understand the process of simplification and operability that an experimental design demands. Well, both Ortega y Gasset and Paul Karl Feyerabend denounce the consequences and absurdities that follow the various forms of reductions for the same science. It is not new at all to recognize in Ortega y Gasset a true philosopher of science, much less find affinities with the great representatives of this disciplinary field. In this work we will analyze how the Orteguian readings of this problem, as well as its proposal, run in parallel to Feyerabend’s complaintsDownloads
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