Right Appetite, Prudence and Practical Truth. The Guidelines of the Eupraxía in the Nicomachean

Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to prove that the Aristotelian prudence (phrónesis) is inseparable from the notion of practical truth, which is structurally intertwined with moral virtues. Based on Fernando Inciarte and Alejandro Vigo, I maintain that practical truth is the érgon of prudence. I also distinguish the prudence of political science, emphasizing the imperative and executive character of the first. With this in mind, I define practical truth from an analysis of the practical syllogism, which is understood as the convergence of truth, reason and right appetite. Finally, I show that the intertwining of moral virtue and practical truth carries the risk of circularity when establishing the rectitude of appetite: reason establishes the rectitude of the appetite, but only the good man is capable of judging with rectitude.