DUNS ESCOTO Y LA VOLUNTAD: AUTONOMÍA SIN VOLUNTARISMO
Keywords:
Duns Scotus, Voluntarism, Jesús de Garay, Affectio commodi, Affectio iustitaeAbstract
In the study of the history of ideas, the use of analytical categories is a common tool for describing, organizing, and synthesizing the positions of classical authors for pedagogical and expository purposes. However, the overuse of such categories can lead to oversimplifications that distort the understanding of their thought, as is the case with the characterization of Duns Scotus as a voluntarist. This interpretation places excessive emphasis on Scotus’s theses regarding self-determination and the primacy of the will, while overlooking the role of the intellect in human action. To fully grasp the complexity of Scotus’s thought, it is essential—following Jesús de Garay—to acknowledge the role that the intellect plays in human agency. This article aims to nuance the voluntarist reading of Scotus by providing a broader textual analysis. First, it examines the origins and uses of the term voluntarist. Next, it reconstructs the rational structure of the will in Scotus that has led to voluntarist interpretations. Finally, it discusses the limitations of this classification, concluding that it is essential to refine the distinction between the appetitive and natural dimensions of the will and its autonomous and free dimension.
Downloads
Metrics
Publication Facts
Reviewer profiles N/A
Author statements
Indexed in
-
—
- Editor & editorial board
- profiles
- Academic society
- N/A
- Publisher
- Asociación para la promoción de la filosofía y la cultura en Málaga (FICUM) y UMAEditorial
To learn about these publication facts, click 
PF is maintained by the Public Knowledge Project
References
Araujo, S. de F. (2016): Wundt and the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology A Reappraisal. Nueva York/ Dordrecht/ Londres: Cham Springer International Publishing.
Boler, J. (1993): «Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 67(1), pp.109–126. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq199367144.
Bradley, F.H. (1904): «On Truth and Practice», Mind, 13(51), pp.309–335.
Burt, D.X. (1987): « Augustine and Divine Voluntarism», Angelicum, 64(3), pp.424–436.
Caldwell, W. (1900): «Pragmatism», Mind, 9(36), pp.433–456.
Coe, G. (1904): «The Philosophy of the Movement for Religious Education», The American Journal of Theology, 8(2), pp.225–239. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/478438.
Cuccia, E.J. (2013): «Primacía de la voluntad y virtud moral en Juan Duns Escoto», Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, (43), pp.153–153. doi: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i43.35.
De Garay, J. (2021) «La voluntad en Duns Escoto: Continuidad y ruptura con Aristóteles», Claridades. Revista de Filosofía, 13(1), pp. 67–97. doi: 10.24310/Claridadescrf.v13i1.10405.
Duns Escoto, J. (1893): Reportata Parisiensia, IV, en Opera Omnia, ed. Wadding-Vivès, París, t. 24.
Duns Escoto, J. (1950): Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, en Opera Omnia, ed. crítica por C. Balic, Vaticano: Ed. Vaticana, IX.
Duns Escoto, J. (1950): Ordinatio, en Opera Omnia, ed. crítica por C. Balic, Vaticano: Ed. Vaticana.
Duns Escoto, J. (1997): Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum, IX, en R. Andrews et al. (eds.), Opera philosophica, IV, St. Bonaventure, Nueva York: Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University.
Duns Escoto, J. (1999): Quaestiones in Librum Porphyrii Isagoge, en R. Andrews et al. (eds.), Opera Philosophica, I, Nueva York: The Franciscan Institute.
Gilson, É. (1952): Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales. París: J. Vrin.
González-Ayesta, C. (2012): «Duns Scotus on the Natural Will», Vivarium, 50(1), pp.33–52. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/156853412x629864.
González-Ayesta, C. (2014): «¿Es la voluntad un apetito o un ‘poder’? La perspectiva de Duns Escoto», Anuario Filosófico, 47(1), pp.77–102. doi: https://doi.org/10.15581/009.47.735.
Hare, J. (2000): «Scotus on Morality and Nature», Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 9(1), pp.15–38. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1057060800091027.
Hare, J. (2007): God and Morality: A Philosophical History. Malden Mass: Blackwell.
Hoffmann, T. (2013): «Freedom Beyond Practical Reason: Duns Scotus on Will-Dependent Relations», British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21(6), pp.1071–1090. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2013.855162.
Ingham, M.B. (2000): «Duns Scotus, Morality and Happiness», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 74(2), pp.173–195. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq200074225.
King, P. (2010): «Scotus’s rejection of Anselm: The two wills theory», en L. Honnefelder, (ed.), Johannes Duns Scotus 1308-2008. Investigations into his philosophy, Archa Verbi Yearbook for the Study of Medieval Theology, Subsidia 5. Münster / Nueva York, Aschendorff Verlag : Franciscan Institute Publications, pp.359–378.
Kohler, J. (1915): «Die Scholastische Methode Und Ihre Geschichte», Archiv Für Rechts Und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 9(1), pp.11–18.
La Piana, G. (1931): «Ancient and Modern Christian Apologetics», Harvard Theological Review, 24(1), pp.1–27. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0017816000025682.
Miralbell, I. (1994): El dinamicismo voluntarista de Duns Escoto. Pamplona: Eunsa.
Schiller, F.C.S. (1905): «The Definition of ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Humanism’», Mind, 14(54), pp.235–240. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/xiv.2.235.
Spiller, G. (1904): «Voluntarism and Intellectualism: A Reconciliation», The Philosophical Review, 13(4), pp.420–428. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2176909.
Thilly, F. (1897): «Schopenhauer’s System in its Philosophical Significance», The Philosophical Review, 6(3), pp.301–307.
Vogt, B. (1925): «Duns Scotus and St. Thomas», Franciscan Studies, (3), pp.24–37.
Vogt, B. (1925): «The Origin and Development of the Franciscan School», Franciscan Studies, (3), pp.5–23.
Williams, T. (1995): «How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness», American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 69(3), pp.425–445. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq199569323.
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Mauricio Lecon Rosales
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Esta revista provee acceso libre inmediato a su contenido bajo el principio de hacer disponible gratuitamente la investigación al público. Todos los contenidos publicados en Claridades. Revista de Filosofía, están sujetos a la licencia Creative Commons Reconocimento-NoComercia-Compartirigual 4.0 cuyo texto completo puede consultar en <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0>
Es responsabilidad de los autores/as obtener los permisos necesarios de las imágenes que están sujetas a derechos de autor.
Los autores/as cuyas contribuciones sean aceptadas para su publicación en esta revista conservarán el derecho no exclusivo de utilizar sus
contribuciones con fines académicos, de investigación y educativos, incluyendo el auto-archivo o depósito en repositorios de acceso abierto de cualquier tipo.
La edición electrónica de esta revista esta editada por la Editorial de la Universidad de Málaga (UmaEditorial), siendo necesario citar la procedencia en cualquier reproducción parcial o total.
6.png)
