On Children’s Moral Status: Beyond the Notion of Moral Agency
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.31.1.2026.19335Keywords:
rationality, moral awareness, dualism, responsabilityAbstract
I explore the consequences and limitations of the notion of moral agency applied to childhood by pointing out 1) how even an adult-centric position on moral agency would have to consider children as moral agents since they meet its criteria of autonomy, responsibility and moral awareness; 2) how other argumentative strategies focused on the notion of person or gradual concepts are also problematic. Thus, I suggest shifting the focus to the specific conditions of an action to avoid both the adultization of children and the belittling of their moral experiences qua children, which may be fruitful for an ethics of childhood.
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