On Children’s Moral Status: Beyond the Notion of Moral Agency

Mar Cabezas

doi:10.24310/contrastes.31.1.2026.19335

Autores/as

Mar Cabezas Universidad de Salamanca España

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24310/contrastes.31.1.2026.19335

Palabras clave:

rationality, moral awareness, dualism, responsability

Resumen

Exploro las consecuencias y limitaciones de la noción de agencia moral aplicada la infancia señalando 1) cómo incluso una posición adultocéntrica sobre la agencia moral tendría que considerar a los niños como agentes morales ya que a cumplen sus criterios de autonomía, responsabilidad y conciencia moral; 2) cómo otras estrategias argumentativas centradas en la noción de persona o en conceptos graduales son también problemáticas. Así, sugiero un cambio de enfoque centrado en las condiciones específicas de una acción para evitar tanto la adultización de los niños como el menosprecio de sus experiencias morales qua niños, lo que beneficiaría una ética de la infancia.

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